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Environmental issues are said to be "issues not just of science or
economics but of governance."1 If so, then these issues are at bottom
philosophical. Since the time of Plato, the question of how we should
govern ourselves cannot be asked without also asking, collectively, what
kind of community we want to create and, individually, what kind of life
each of us wants to live.
Recent scholarship reveals a torrent of diverging approaches to the
conceptual underpinnings of environmental law and policy. From
historians chronicling the evolution of our understanding and attitudes
toward nature,2 political scientists analyzing the political ideology behind
the modem green movement and philosophers exploring ways in which
current ecological discourse can be enriched by a re-examination of the
work of important thinkers in Western philosophy, such as Aristotle,
Thomas Hobbes, and Immanuel Kant,4 thinkers from a variety of fields are
crossing disciplinary boundaries to address the environmental implications
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of globalization and new technologies.5 Although their approaches are
varied and their conclusions are sometimes at odds, recent environmental
thought, as represented by the works reviewed in this essay, is
characterized by the quest for a coherent conceptual framework within
which current ecological challenges may be understood and met. This is a
quintessentially philosophical endeavor.
The writing reviewed in this essay leaves the impression that there
is an awareness that the environmental consequences of past (and current)
practices present fundamental questions that thinkers in earlier eras did not
ask. And, because theory is nothing more than an attempt to tackle practical
problems conceptually, systems of thought that grew out of a different set
of challenges may no longer be adequate. For instance, the differences
between the right and the left that dominated political struggles in the
twentieth century may not have the importance they once had, largely due
to the emergence of ecological challenges. As Andrew Dobson puts it in the
third edition of Green PoliticalThought, arguing about the "respective merits
of capitalism and communism is rather like rearranging deckchairs on the
Titanic."6 While there is room for debate as to the aptness of the catastrophic
metaphor, it is certainly true that both of these politico-economic models
subordinated (or wholly ignored) the ecological ramifications of rapid
economic expansion as they subscribed to the "super-ideology" of
industrialism and the belief that "human needs can only be met through the
permanent expansion of the process of production and consumption."7
Historical Antecedents
Recent works place contemporary environmental writing in
historical context: Roderick Frazier Nash's classic, Wilderness and the
American Mind, recently re-issued in a fourth edition, with a new epilogue;
and Chris J. Magoc's anthology of American environmental thought, So
Glorious a Landscape: Nature and the Environment in American History and
Culture.
Nash chronicles the evolution of attitudes toward wilderness from
the fear of a cursed land and the hostility toward untamed forest waiting to
be cleared that characterized the ancient world, to a more recently acquired
appreciation of the biological, aesthetic, and spiritual values of wilderness.
Nash contends that for the most part these changing conceptions have
nevertheless been merely variations on a theme. Although the prevailing
conception of the natural world has changed markedly, particularly in the
last century, a bedrock assumption has remained as a foundation: viz, that
the Archimedean point is humankind. Beneath both the ancient world's fear
of wilderness as a desolate wasteland and the technocrats' yearning for
pristine wild places to recharge their batteries is the belief that the value of
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such places is, in the end, to be measured against an anthropocentric
yardstick.
In Nash's sweeping study of the idea of wilderness in Western
thought originally published in 1967, and in the second and third editions
(1973 and 1982, respectively), the principal arguments for setting aside wild
places were at bottom anthropocentric: we need to preserve entire
ecosystems in their primordial state so that we may tap them in the future
for medicines; game preserves in Africa bring tourist dollars to hungry
populations; national parks are uniquely capable of rejuvenating wilderness
experiences for weary urban dwellers.
Chris Magoc has assembled a wonderfully rich collection of
writings on the environment in So Glorious a Landscape: Nature and the
Environment in American History and Culture. Native American creation
myths, Thoreauvian meditations on nature, and contemporary analyses of
the perils of human population growth sit side by side in this wide-ranging
compendium. The juxtaposition of the full texts of the National
Environmental Policy Act (1969) and the Northwest Ordinance (1787)
brings into sharp relief their divergent conceptions of nature and
wilderness. Well-known authors such as John Muir, Henry David Thoreau,
Edward Abbey, and Aldo Leopold are represented here.
Magoc has grouped the excerpts according to theme, introducing
each set of writings with an essay placing the authors and their
contributions in context. The first set of writings explores the interface
between European settlers and Native Americans, how they conceived of
and experienced the natural world on this continent, and the ecological
consequences of roughly the first century of the American republic." After
the nature writing tradition associated with Thoreau and Muir, Magoc
brings together some of the early ecological thinkers who decried
environmental despoliation as much as a century before the first Earth Day.
Re-tellings of well-known environmental catastrophes-the contamination
at Love Canal and the destruction of the Appalachians as described by
Harry M. Caudill-contrast with successful calls for preservation of scenic
natural areas, such as a 1954 David Brower entreaty to set aside Dinosaur
National Monument on the Utah-Colorado border. The final section consists
of writings confronting contemporary environmental challenges. Magoc's
collection, and the helpful interludes, placing the excerpts in context, is a
valuable digest of environmental writing in the United States.
The Hegemony of the Market
If Dobson is correct that one's choice of economic system (on the
left-right spectrum) is becoming less important, it is still beyond dispute
that economic ideas continue to dominate environmental discourse. Public
debates, for example, are frequently pitched in terms of jobs versus
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environment, such as in the spotted owl controversy in the Pacific
Northwest, the issue of oil production in the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge on Alaska's North Slope, or the question of what steps the United
States should take to curb greenhouse gas emissions. Judging from the
works reviewed here, environmental thought at this historical moment is
(perhaps rightly) pre-occupied with the pernicious effect of market forces
on the environment. One of the most critical theoretical tasks facing these
thinkers at this time is the imperative of supplanting economic efficiency as
the pervasive norm
In addition to economic themes, ethical quandaries are central to
the works reviewed here. For instance, John Martin Gillroy contends that
economic efficiency is not a morally neutral concept and its hidden ethical
content needs to be brought to light. Dobson analyzes in depth, and with
admirable clarity, debates between those who ascribe intrinsic value to
nature and those who retain an anthropocentric ethical theory. Nicholas
Low's anthology presents more than a dozen papers from a conference
where ethical issues were the focus.
Gillroy presents a fascinating attempt to supplant the dominant
market paradigm (whichrests on quasi-utilitarian ethical assumptions) with
a theoretical system within which competing environmental policy options
can be analyzed. According to Gillroy, the prevailing approach to questions
of environmental policy in the United States is market oriented. As such, it
is ethically and philosophically weak because it fails to take into account the
practical necessities for individuals to lead meaningful lives and to flourish.
He argues that most current environmental statutes (and judicial
constructions of them) are built on philosophical sand, because they are
founded on an uncritical acceptance of the maxim that some degree of
environmental risk (to be borne by a relatively small portion of the
populace) is acceptable to promote economic growth for the society as a
whole. Gillroy argues for displacing the market paradigm from its
dominance of environmental policy debates with a conception of individual
autonomy based on Immanuel Kant's moral philosophy.
He contends that the overall aim of American environmental
legislation-particularly as evidenced by the Clean Air Act; the Clean Water
Act); the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA); the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA); the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA); and the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act-has been, and continues to be,
the protection of the market from excess regulation whenever possible."
Under TSCA, for instance, chemicals are marketed first, and only later, after
harmful effects surface, are the chemicals investigated for human health
hazards."0 Gillroy contends that RCRA and CERCLA embrace efficiency as
they internalize into the market's pricing mechanisms the costs of future
harm that might be caused by hazardous substances. Even the Endangered
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Species Act (ESA), according to Gillroy, elevates economic efficiency over
the intrinsic value of nature: e.g., in the determination of critical habitat," in
the establishment of the Endangered Species Committee, 2 and in the
allowances for economic hardship exemptions. 3 He acknowledges,
however, that the ESA "comes the closest to representing different core
values in the law." 4
Gillroy's analysis of a century and a half of American policy vis-hvis natural resources and the environment (from the westward expansion
in the nineteenth century to the slate of statutes enacted roughly three
decades ago) unveil the pervasive market orientation of that approach. As
the Nation grew beyond the Atlantic seaboard, government action toward
nature was characterized by a policy (or an ethic) of maximization:maximize
the amount of timber harvested, maximize the minerals extracted, and even
maximize the amount of waste disposed of in the environment. In general,
the overall aim was the maximization of the use of nature in the service of
American economic growth.
The role of government during this era was to make nature
"available to the economic process, securing and transferring land,
protecting trade, and in all ways facilitating private commerce and its
technological innovations."" The environment was conceived as "resource
and as waste receptacle." 6 It was assumed that there was zero cost
associated with using nature as a store of resources for our extraction and
as a sink for disposal of waste. 7 Rapid advance of technology, combined
with growing density of urban areas, contributed to a change of attitudes
toward nature and a questioning of the assumptions implicit in the policy
of maximization. Maximization was evidently not as efficient as originally
believed to be. Gillroy distills the factors leading to the demise of the
maximization approach:
[The] near-zero price of species, minerals and
[environmental] media.. .combined with the unregulated
advancement of technology.. .[to cause] the market to fail by
overuse. Without the true price of resources and pollution
reflected in the economic calculation of efficiency, and with
the growing"8 sophistication of technology, the market did not
take all the contingencies into account in its maintenance of
long-term efficiency and, as a result, extracted too much from
the environment and put too much back in as pollution. 9
The second era of American environmental policy, in Gillroy's
analysis, arose out of the failures of the first. The equation of maximization
and efficiency gradually gave way to a new approach in which optimization
was the byword. Promotion of unbridled mining, logging, and pollution
yielded to a system that purported to be a careful calibration of the optimal
levels of extraction and disposal." To compensate for market failure,
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government's aim was to rectify the unforeseen consequences of the
maximization of resource extraction and the virtually unlimited pollution
of air, land, and water, by "set[ting] optimal rates of extraction and
disposal, given the technology available and the natural contingencies of
species, minerals, and media." 2'
The policy of optimization was guided by the concept of the
"materials balance."' In this conceptual model, the natural world, seen in
purely instrumental terms, is a store of natural resources for economic use,
and nothing more. The economy "is assumed neither to create nor to
destroy nature but 'merely' to transform it."' The materials balance does
not accord any significance to a qualitative state of a natural entity or
system; nature's value lies solely in its ability to serve the goal of wealth
accumulation. As Gillroy puts it, "The economy neither destroys nor creates
but merely transforms: trees into lumber, tigers into coats."24 Efficiency
"remains the core principle of a regulated government market and the basis
for the origin of environmental law," because efficiency is the foundation
of natural-resource extraction law, producing "a law and policy of pollution
and risk abatement as the25 government regulated market seeks the optimal
level of contamination."
From the perspective of the policy of optimization, waste discharge
"is a legitimate use of the absorption capacity of each environmental
medium."26 Nature's capacity to hold and purify pollutants is measured
against the demands of wealth maximization: "the trick is to minimize the
costs of pollution control to the economy by allowing the maximum amount
of pollution possible, while abating just enough so as not to exceed the
tolerances of [environmental] media as storage and purification devices."27
The policies of maximization and optimization assume a division of nature
into "distinct media, each with a capacity, not for function, but for waste
assimilation at minimal (zero) cost."' Gillroy argues that the division of
environmental regulation according to environmental media, e.g., air
pollution is regulated under the Clean Air Act while water pollution has its
own separate statutory framework, the Clean Water Act,' is an outgrowth
of the market paradigm, and that environmental policy's "piecemeal
approach to the conceptualization of nature" is grounded in an economic
viewpoint."
Defining pollution as an externality, i.e., as "a social cost imposed
by market processes but not priced within the market system," 31 places
nature "into an economic context where its instrumental value is
emphasized."' When the modem era of environmental legislation came
into being three decades ago, it was not "that a concern for ecology became
competitive with, or dominant to, economic ends, but that non-optimal
release of pollution had degraded environmental quality and made nature
of less use to human communities. Legislation and subsequent regulations
have been aimed, not at the protection of the environment, but at the long-
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term protection of an efficient materials balance that provides for our longterm economic growth." ' According to Gillroy, although the rhetoric of
environmental protection pays lip service to ecocentrism, "environmental
values do not determine policy. The economy's health continues as the
major focus of environmental regulation; not a single environmental law
places natural systems first."'
Gillroy examines the unique regulatory problems arising from
environmental risk, as compared with traditional pollution. Traditional
pollution is typically noticeable to the untrained eye (discolored streams,
smog, foul-smelling chemicals dumped on the ground), and the
mechanisms of generation, transmission, and response are understood by
science. But in the case of environmental risk, these mechanisms are poorly
understood, and even the trained professional is unable to detect the
presence of radiological emissions, the effects of genetic experimentation,
or the extent of recently-invented toxic chemicals in groundwater.3 5 In
addition, with traditional pollutants, the risks are often relatively easy to
measure and the effects are incremental; a greater quantity of a given
pollutant is generally correlated with a quantifiable increase in the
deleterious effects. But the potential synergistic effects of mixing new
toxins, and the relatively unknown nature of the risk associated with such
chemicals, make environmental risk much harder to manage, because the
risks are at once "clandestine and cumulative" in contrast to traditional
pollution's obvious and incremental nature. ' Furthermore, with
environmental risk there is a radical asymmetry between the costs of worst
case scenarios and the benefits: large-scale radioactive contamination as
compared to nuclear energy production; atmospheric release of the most
virulent toxins versus the benefits of synthetic chemicals. Finally, in part
because our objective, scientific understanding of these risks is so poor, we
are left to weigh the risks associated with these newer technologies
subjectively, and such risks are given a low subjective probability.' "The
reality of low (near zero) subjective probabilities of infinitely harmful costs
label environmental risk as a zero-infinity problem." '
Of interest from the perspectiv of distributive justice is the fact that
the gamble involved in environmental risk "is being imposed upon the
general population while the economic benefits are limited to those with
market access or control of the technology and products involved."39 And
the risk is collective: "Unlike private market transactions, which affect
principally those involved in the exchange, environmental-risk transactions
affect wide populations of people with or without their knowledge or
consent."' "The collective nature of risk, with its stealth quality, produces
situations where one may be affected by a toxin generated by other persons,
miles away, without one's knowledge and not know it until ten or twenty
years later when health effects surface."4 The effects of environmental risk
are not privately irreversible, "like consuming a hamburger, but collectively
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irreversible. One individual or firm may impose an irreversible stealth harm
on the community that may not become evident for years or generations."'
Gillroy's point is that the market paradigm's focus on cost-benefit
calculations is ill equipped to guide policy involving environmental risk. 3
What is at stake, at least potentially, is more than just economic cost, but,
argues Gillroy, the capacity to think for oneself, to act autonomously in the
world, to have voluntary purposeful action, and to order one's
preferences." This is so because our "ability to think and process
information" is made dependent on natural phenomena of which we are
increasingly ignorant.45
[H]arm should be distinguished from cost as that result of
environmental risk that negatively affects the intrinsic
capacities of human or natural systems ....
In effect, costs and
benefits cease to be positive and negative sides of the same
coin: prevention of harm due to its effects on essential value
has priority over provision of a benefit in welfare
terms ....
Harm to moral or functional integrity is essential; it
is separate and more important than cost to the economy or
to any individual in the market and is therefore not
subsumed in the efficient maximization of wealth nor in
instrumental preferences for welfare improvements... .The
capacity for human agency and the capacity for the natural
environment to functionally persist should provide the core
concerns of environmental-risk policy. These are basic,
necessary, and comprehensive concepts of intrinsic value in
that they have to do with the internal integrity of living and
evolving organic, and, in the case of the human individual,
moral capacities. Respecting essential freedom within the
context of environmental risk necessitates that the central
authority anticipate free riders and regulate their behavior so
that constituent capacities are protected and empowered
before economic externalities can harm them. Anticipatory
regulation of economic market behavior through an active
state requires a justification scheme that transcends
preference, consent, and 'willingness to pay' as a basis for
policy choice."
Gillroy analyzes the ethical foundations of a cost-benefit criterion
and finds it to be grounded "on the basis of one's voluntary consent, where
one's autonomy, or freedom of choice, is the foundational moral ideal."47
While the market operates on the assumption that individuals are selfsufficient and market transactions are sanctioned on the basis of voluntary
consent, the question arises whether the market's idea of an autonomous
trader can be "transferred into the realm of public environmental choice,
which requires that we adequately represent at least human intrinsic
value."' Gillroy argues that the market's foundational assumptions do
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violence to individual autonomy. For instance, a policy founded on the
assumption that all wealth-maximizing allocations of resources gain the
consent of all consumers who benefit actually takes sovereignty away from
the individual.49 This is because, at least in part, "nonwealth-based choices
are an important moral dimension of autonomy" that policy makers must
takeinto account.' The problem for the market paradigm is that it cannot
properly take this important aspect into consideration because it aggregates
individual interests into public policy based on the assumption that
individuals "are self-sufficient and free to trade."-5
One of the primary weaknesses of cost-benefit analysis as a policymaking guide, according to Gillroy, is that it is "based on a definition of
autonomy that is antithetical to centralized regulation. Cost-benefit
methods empower the policy-maker only insofar as she protects and
mimics market allocations. In addition, the public administrator's decision
is not based upon real consumer choice but upon assumed metaphysical
connections between welfare and consent that are then imputed to all social
valuations." 2 The market reduces the individual to nothing more than a
"rational maximizer of personal welfare" and thereby implicitly equates
reason with desire satisfaction; in this model, it is irrational to refrain from
maximizing the satisfaction of one's desires.
If one can reason practically, recognize one's intrinsic value
as an autonomous moral agent, and judge when desire ought
to play a role in decision making and when it ought not, then
one may be said to have noninstrumental value and a
complex sense of self. This dualistic mind, with both ethical
and nonethical properties, is beyond the scope of the market
paradigm and cost-benefit methods, which prescribe policy
only for one-dimensional humans.'
As an illustration of the inadequacy of the market paradigm,
Gillroy compares an individual's preference for cocaine to a preference for
water:
Both are commodities, with consumer markets where
preferences are fulfilled, making the recipient more satisfied
than in his initial condition, thereby rendering a net benefit to
him. That the former may impede one's capacity to think and
act for one's self, whereas the latter may enhance those same
capacities has no effect on market assumptions that support
one's willingness to pay for cocaine and would proclaim
either choice as autonomous. 5
The market paradigm, argues Gillroy, "has established environmental
metapolicy, codified in statute[s] and reinforced by the courts... .If
environmental law, as its exists, is ineffective and unfair, displacing
pollution from air and water to land rather than eliminating it, and suffers
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from a piecemeal approach by the division of nature into sectors for use, it
is precisely because of the core status of the principle of efficiency in
creating that law and policy which we now perceive is inadequate." s6
Ethical Foundations
Dobson distinguishes environmentalism from a political ideology
he calls "ecologism." Environmentalism is characterized by the idea that we
can solve environmental problems by rationalizing current processes and
incorporating new scientific and technological advances, while leaving basic
practices, institutions, and attitudes largely untouched. Ecologism embraces
the notion that our current ecological crisis mandates fundamental changes

in the way we interact with nature. Ecologism is not comfortable with
environmentalism's incrementalism and its eagerness to work within
existing frameworks. Dobsonillustrates the difference thusly: "the Queen
of England does not suddenly become a political57ecologist by having her
fleet of limousines converted to lead-free petrol."
Ecologists believe in the limits of growth and a questioning of
strong anthropocentrism.' Ecologism is "a challenge to the political, social
and scientific consensus that has dominated the last two or three hundred
years of public life."' It "seeks to decentre the human being, to question
mechanistic science and its technological consequences, to refuse to believe
that the world was made for human beings, " ' ° and it questions "whether
dominant post-industrialism's project of material affluence is either
desirable or sustainable."6 This is quite different from "an
environmentalism that seeks a cleaner service economy sustained by clean
technology and producing cleaner affluence."'
While many would consider environmentalism and ecologism to
be moderate and radical strains of the same general Earth-friendly
perspective, Dobson, interestingly, argues that environmentalism is more
compatible with the political ideologies of liberalism, socialism, and
feminism than it is with ecologism.6 The intellectual starting-point for
ecologism is the Earth itself, considered as a physical object. The Earth's
finitude is the "basic reason why infinite population and economic growth
are impossible and why, consequently, profound changes in our social and
political behavior need to take place."" What emerges from Dobson's
carefully reasoned and thoroughly researched study is an appreciation for
the political-theoretical foundations of the green movement as it has
surfaced in the last several decades in a multitude of Western democracies.
In the epilogue of the fourth edition of Wilderness and the American
Mind, Nash makes a case for an ethic of wilderness protection that asks not
how to protect wild places for our purposes; instead, he presents a case for
preserving wilderness for its own purposes: "Wilderness is notfor us at all.
We should allow it to exist out of respect for the intrinsic values of the rest
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of nature and particularly for the life forms dependent on wild habitats."o
Nash's articulation of an ecocentric rationale for wilderness preservation is
here only a sketch-more a gesture toward a rationale than a trenchant
analysis of the idea. Readers searching for such an analysis are better off
consulting his 1989 work, The Rights of Nature: A History of Environmental
Ethics," where developments in and debates among the competing schools
of thought are surveyed and explicated in some detail. The intrinsic-value
thesis is also explored cogently in Dobson's Green PoliticalThought.
Probably the most interesting idea in Nash's new epilogue is his
vision for our planet's future, which he calls "Island Civilization."67 The
basic idea is to harness technology to reduce our "footprint," leaving large
areas of Earth free of human scarring." The developed world Nash
imagines would be more like "Greek city-states, medieval monasteries,
[and] pueblos of the Southwest" than "New York housing projects."' He
calls it "clustering on a planetary scale-building in rather than building
out, controlling civilization instead of wilderness."' Underlying this model
for our future "is an expanded environmental ethic that functions as a
restraint on human freedom in regard to nature, just as our present social
ethic limits our relationships with other people."" Nash dreams of a time
when "the unconditioned ownership and abuse of nature" is as
unacceptable as slavery is today.' The recent amendment of pet ordinances
in a number of American cities to substitute pet "guardian" for pet "owner"
may be an indication that popular attitudes are moving in this direction.
Although the "Island Civilization" is an intriguing notion and a
worthy candidate as a guide for global development policy, Nash's
epilogue only modestly adds to his classic study. The chief value of this
fourth edition is Nash's timeless account of the milestones of American
wilderness preservation-from the colossal failures at Hetch Hetchy and
Glen Canyon to the spectacular successes in the Adirondacks and
Yellowstone-and his tracing of wilderness as a human construct from the
ancient world to the present.
Ecologism raises fundamental questions about how we live our
daily lives, how our social institutions are structured, how our economy is
structured, and how our politics are conducted. It reminds us that how we
get around town, how we get to work, what we buy, and how we entertain
ourselves have profound ecological consequences. When ecologists point
towards a society in which human fulfillment is richer and more rewarding
and, at the same time, argue that permanent economic growth cannot be
sustained, they are challenging not just our economics and our politics, but
also our conception of what it means to be successful, what makes life
valuable. As long as success is measured by the great majority of society as
being synonymous with wealth, a highly consumptive and extractive
economy will continue to flourish.
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Environmental Justice
The environmental justice movement, with its focus on protecting
people, is quite different from the traditional environmental preservation
movement. The environmental movement from roughly the late nineteenth
century to the 1980s or so has heavily, though not exclusively, emphasized
the protection of remote, wild places, through efforts to protect species
endangered by extinction, rivers threatened by dams, roadless areas, and
so forth. With its focus on beautiful scenery in far away places, many of
which are set aside for recreation and appreciation by those who can afford
to visit them, the traditional environmental movement has been largely a
club for the privileged.
The environmental justice movement, by contrast, is primarily
concerned with protecting people from the harmful effects of toxic
pollutants released by industrial development where people live, work, and
play. For a variety of reasons-zoning, housing patterns, access to power,
economic clout, latent bigotry, etc.-the locations for industrial activities
that release toxic pollutants into the water, land, and air tend to be
overwhelmingly nearer to where poor non-Anglo populations live, work,
and play than to where wealthy Anglo populations live, work, and play.
Thus, the environmental justice movement is more about the distribution
of harmful industrial activities and its relative impacts on differentlysituated human populations than about protecting obscure animal species
whose habitat has been reduced, or protecting a far-away scenic place from
construction of a road.
The primary threads joining these two movements are opposition
to unbridled economic development. More fundamentally, though, the
bridge between these two aspects of the environmental movement is a
philosophical idea that is at the core of ecologism as well. It is the
recognition that the marketplace does not always take into account the
ethical value that is destroyed by pollution or reckless development. When
human activity destroys or degrades the habitat for human and non-human
species in the name of human progress, the true cost is not accounted for
within the terms of the market. In other words, the environmental
movement and the environmental justice movement share the belief that the
natural world is priceless.
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